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Abstract- Islamic banks (IBs) have three major sources of 
funds namely: shareholders' funds, transaction deposits 
and Mudaraba deposits (by profit-sharing investment 
account holders-PSIAHs). Shareholders have their 
interest protected by the IBs’ directors, transactional 
accounts deposits are guaranteed by the banks. PSIAHs 
on the other hand have no representation on the banks’ 
board and their funds are not guaranteed. They rely on 
the goodwill of the banks’ board of directors and 
management to protect their interest and share profit (if 
any) from the investment of their funds and could lose 
some or all their capital if the banks incur losses. This 
could give rise to moral hazard and agency problem 
which put the PSIAHs at a disadvantage that calls for the 
establishment of corporate governance policies to protect 
their interest. The objective of this paper is to review 
corporate governance issues in the management of 
PSIAHs by IBs and to share Nigeria’s experience in the 
protection of the interest of PSIAHs. It is expected that 
the Nigerian experience could be a learning point for 
regulatory and supervisory authorities in other 
jurisdictions to replicate. The paper contributes to 
literature on the deposit practices by IBs which has been 
reported to be scarce. 
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Banks serve as intermediaries for the mobilisation 
of funds from the surplus sector to the deficit sector of 
the economy through deposits mobilised from their 
customers [1]. Conventional banks accept deposits as 
loans from their customers in which they pay interest 
and guarantee its repayment hence maintaining a single 
creditor-debtor relationship. Islamic banks (IBs) on the 
other hand are prohibited from dealing in interest and 
as such use different contracts to mobilise deposits and 
maintain numerous relationships with their customers 
[2]. Reference [3] observed that the general debate in 
corporate governance parlance has been on one major 
issue, whether the directors of organisations owe their 
fiduciary responsibilities to the shareholders of the 
                                                     
 
organisations only or such responsibilities should be 
extended to other stakeholders of the organisations. 
Reference [3] opined further that considering the nature 
of banks, the fiduciary duties of their directors should 
be expanded beyond their shareholders to include other 
stakeholders. 
IBs have three key sources of funding their 
activities namely: equity provided by their 
shareholders, transaction deposits that are guaranteed 
by the banks (and as such considered liability to the 
banks) and investment deposit also known as Profit-
Sharing Investment Accounts (PSIAs) [4]. Of all the 
three sources of funding for Islamic banks, PSIAs are 
considered the most vulnerable that require special 
protection. This is because, shareholders have their 
interest protected by the banks’ directors, and 
transactional deposits (that can be likened to current 
accounts in conventional banks) that is usually based 
on the contract qard-(benevolent loan) or wadiah (safe 
custody) are considered  debt and are guaranteed by 
the bank and repaid on demand, and the law typically 
provides a governance structure for debt holders in the 
case of default [5]. Profit Sharing Investment Account 
Holders’ (PSIAHs) on the other hand have no 
representation on the banks’ board to protect their 
interest, and based on the provision of mudarabah 
contract that governs PSIAs, their funds cannot be 
guaranteed by the bank and therefore exposing them 
(PSIAHs) to the possibility of losing part of all their 
funds [6].  
Another governance challenge in the management 
of PSIAs by IBs is the measurement and sharing of risk 
and return between the banks’ shareholders and 
PSIAHs, taking into cognizance the risk appetite of 
PSIAHs whom are believed to be generally risk-averse 
compared to shareholders [7]. The policies set by the 
IBs’ board of directors are more likely to reflect the 
risk-return preference of their shareholders than those 
of PSIAHs [8]. Given the fact that IBs comingle their 
shareholders’ funds with funds from other sources 
including PSIAHs’ funds raise another important 
governance issue of the extent to which the banks’ 
investment portfolios reflect their PSIAHs’ 
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preferences. More so, as the IBs strive to maximise 
their shareholders’ wealth, there is the tendency that 
the banks may give preference to shareholders’ funds 
over PSIAHs’ funds in investment in profitable 
ventures.  
Reference [5] observed that the complete absence 
of corporate governance structure for PSIAHs in IBs 
raises fundamental governance issues of possible 
conflict of interest between shareholders and PSIAHs, 
hence the need for market discipline and full disclosure 
of information to enable the PSIAHs to take informed 
decisions to protect their funds and their overall 
interest. These necessitate having a sound governance 
framework that would ensure the protection of 
PSIAHs’ funds and their overall interest. The objective 
of this paper is to identify the governance challenges 
that PSIAs pose on the operation of Islamic banks and 
to share and highlight the various guidelines issued by 
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) towards the 
protection of the interest of PSIAHs in Nigeria. It is 
expected that the experience could be replicated by 
Regulatory and Supervisory Authorities (RSAs) in 
other jurisdictions towards the protection of the 
interest of PSIAHs in their jurisdictions.  
To achieve this objective, the rest of this paper is 
organised as follows: Section 2 is on banker-customer 
relationships in Islamic banking and how they differ 
from conventional finance. Section 3 is on mudarabah 
deposits (being the underlying contract in PSIAs), its 
type, characteristics, and importance to Islamic banks. 
Sections 4 is on corporate governance in Islamic banks 
and issues in the management of profit-sharing 
investment accounts, Section 5 is on Islamic banking 
in Nigeria while Section 6 is on efforts at protecting 
the interest of PSIAHs by the Central Bank of Nigeria, 
while Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
II. BANKER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP 
IN ISLAMIC BANKING 
 
In conventional banking, the primary relationship 
that exist between banks and their depositors as cited 
by [9] in the celebrated case of Foley v. Hill is that of 
a debtor and creditor. When the customer deposits 
money with the bank (for safe keeping or investment), 
the customer lends the money to the bank and the bank 
is obliged to return the money on demand (for current 
account) or at the expiration of contractual relationship 
(for investment deposit), hence the customer becomes 
a lender and the bank a borrower. The relationship is 
reversed as soon as the customer’s account is 
overdrawn, the bank becomes the creditor and the 
customer the debtor and the relationship continues to 
subsist in that way until the customer repaid back the 
loan [10].  
Islamic banks on the other hand mobilise deposits 
using different contracts and as such maintain various 
relationship with their customers. They accept deposit 
using a contract of guaranteed custody (wadi’ah) or as 
loan (qard) to be guaranteed and repaid on demand or 
through restricted or unrestricted mudarabah [11].  
Reference [12] observed that the banker-customer 
relationships between IBs and their customers are 
based on the common banking products offered by the 
banks. For financing purposes, it could take the form 
of vendor-purchaser (example in a murabaha contract), 
investor-entrepreneur (example in a in mudarabah 
contract), principal-agent (example in a wakala 
contract), lessor-lessee (example in an ijarah contract), 
transferor-transferee (example in a diminishing 
musharaka), and between partners in a business 
venture (example in a musharaka contract). For the 
deposit account, it can be that of agent-principal 
(example in a wakala deposit contract), depositor-
custodian (example in a wadiah deposit contract), 
lender-borrower (example in a qard based deposit 
contract but free of interest), investor-entrepreneur 
(example in a mudarabah deposit contract) as well as 
between fellow partners in a joint investment project 
(example in a musharaka deposit contract). 
However, as observed by Muneeza et. al (2011) 
and cited by [12], all the rights and obligations of a 
banker and customer in conventional banks are also 
applicable in Islamic banking. The only point of 
divergence is that some of the rights and duties of the 
bank to its customers and vice versa are different from 
that of conventional banks depending on the type of 
product and or service that is being utilized. 
Reference [13] captures the key differences in the 
banker-customer relationship that subsist between 
Islamic and Conventional banks and their customers as 
presented in the table below: 
 
TABLE1: DIFFERENCES IN BANKER-CUSTOMER 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAMIC AND 
CONVENTIONAL BANKS 

















As could be observed from table above, the basic 
relationship subsisting between conventional banks 
and their customers is that of a debtor-creditor and vice 
versa, whereas IBs have many different relationships 
between them and their clients. This calls for the 
establishment of governance framework that would 
ensure that the interest of each class of customer is 
taken care of especially PSIAHs because of their 
unique characteristics as expounded in the subsequent 
section below. 
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III. PROFIT-SHARING INVESTMENT 
ACCOUNTS: NATURE AND 
CHARACTERISTICS 
One of the major contracts used by Islamic banks 
in the mobilisation of deposit which clearly 
distinguishes them from conventional banks is 
mudarabah deposit also called PSIAs while the 
account holders are called [14]. PSIAs operate under 
the profit/loss sharing (PLS) scheme where neither 
capital nor any pre-fixed returns is guaranteed by the 
bank [15]. Reference [16] observed that the total 
investment portfolio of Islamic banks is mostly 
financed by Investment Account Holders’ (IAHs’) 
funds, in addition to other sources like shareholders’ 
funds and others. However, the share of PSIAs in the 
total deposit of IBs vary across banks from less than 
five percent (holding only demand and savings 
deposit) to over 80% in some banks [17]. PSIAHs can 
be compared to shareholders of companies who 
receive dividends when the company declares profit or 
lose part or their entire investment when the company 
makes a loss [18]. However they do not meet the strict 
definition of shareholders, because shareholders have 
the contractual right to vote in general meetings to 
elect members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of 
their respective banks and thus have the power to hire 
and fire senior management through their control of 
the BODs but PSIAHs lack such powers [19]. Also, 
unlike shareholders who can sell their shares in the 
capital market when they are dissatisfied with the 
operations of the bank, PSIAHs can only withdraw 
their monies when dissatisfied with the IBs’ operations 
with a possible loss of any profit that would be due to 
them if they withdraw before the maturity of the 
contract. In the same vein, PSIAHs do not meet the 
basic characteristics of depositors because neither their 
capital investment nor return on their investment is 
guaranteed by the bank [20]. Reference [20] explained 
that PSIAHs choose among Islamic banks based on the 
level of confidence in the bank’s competencies and 
abilities to realize returns from their invested capital, 
and lack of such confidence will drive PSIAHs to 
switch to less-opaque Islamic banks. PSIAHs are 
principals who entrust their resources to an agent (the 
banks’ management) except that the agent is appointed 
by another principal, that is the shareholders which 
could give rise to conflict of interest between the two 
principals [21]. 
Under mudarabah contract that governs the 
operations of PSIAs, all losses on investments 
financed by these funds (due to credit and market risks) 
are to be borne by the PSIAHs, while profits realised 
on those investments are shared between the PSIAHs 
and the Islamic banks as fund managers of the 
investments (mudarib) in the proportions specified in 
the contract. However, any loss due to misconduct and 
or negligence is borne by the IB [22] and [7].   
It is based on the above characteristics of PSIAHs 
that [23] prescribed that the equity of PSIAHs be 
presented as an independent item between liabilities 
and owners’ equity in the statement of financial 
position of Islamic banks (because it is neither one of 
the two). The above unique characteristics of PSIAHs 
makes it imperative for the management of IBs to 
institutionalise comprehensive corporate governance 
practices that take into cognizance the specificities of 
PSIAHs and that would ensure the protection of their 
rights and interest.  
 
A. Types of Profit-Sharing Investment 
Accounts 
Mudarabah account as the underlying contract used in 
PSIAs in the mobilization of resources could be either 
restricted or unrestricted [24, pp.256]. 
 
i. Restricted Investment Account (RIA) 
Restricted Investment Account (RIA) is a 
mudarabah account whose holders authorize the IB to 
invest their funds either on mudarabah or wakala basis 
with certain restrictions as to the type of investment 
they could deploy the funds into, where to invest 
(industry or location), how to invest, tenure of the 
investment and for what purpose the funds are to be 
invested [25]. RIAs could be likened to mutual funds 
in conventional finance and are managed separately 
from other funds of the IBs [19].  
 
ii. Unrestricted Investment Accounts 
(URIAs)  
Unrestricted Investment Accounts (URIAs) on the 
other hand is a mudarabah contract whereby the capital 
providers (PSIAHs) permit the IB as the fund manager 
(mudarib) to invest their funds as the bank deems fit 
without any restriction on the type of investment to be 
undertaken, the location, time, comingling of the funds 
and so on [24, pp.256]. URIAHs are usually high net 
worth individuals that are quite sophisticated in 
investment with high risk appetite. 
Under URIA contract, the IB has a wide range of 
choices as to the type of trade to undertake, with whom 
to trade and in which location to undertake such trade. 
Losses if any is borne by the PSIAHs except in proven 
cases of negligence or breach of contract on the part of 
the bank as a mudarib.  
 
 
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
ISLAMIC BANKS: ISSUES IN THE 
MANAGEMENT OF PROFIT-SHARING 
INVESTMENT ACCOUNTs 
 
Corporate governance is defined as a set of 
mechanisms and institutions which are intended to 
provide efficient monitoring and control over a firm’s 
strategy and operation [26]. It involves a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its 
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board, its shareholders and other stakeholders [27]. It 
provides the mechanism of setting the objectives of a 
corporation and the means of determining the 
attainment and monitoring the performance of those 
objectives. Good governance is essential to the ability 
of a business to protect the interests of its stakeholders 
[21]. Good corporate governance practices facilitate 
access to finance for an organisation especially when 
the governance structure creates enforceability of the 
rights of investors and lead to lower cost of capital for 
an organisation by reducing the risks associated with 
lending to that organization [28]. 
From Islamic banks’ perspective, the Islamic 
Financial Services Board in its Guiding Principles on 
Corporate Governance for Institutions Offering Only 
Islamic Financial Services (IIFS) [29], observed that  a 
good corporate governance for IBs should encompass 
the following: 
i. a set of organizational arrangements 
whereby the actions of the management 
of the IIFS are aligned, as far as possible, 
with the interests of its stakeholders; 
ii. provision of proper incentives for the 
organs of governance such as the Board 
of Directors, Shariah Supervisory Board 
(SSB) and management to pursue 
objectives that are in the interests of the 
stakeholders and facilitate effective 
monitoring, thereby encouraging the 
IIFS to use resources more efficiently; 
and 
iii. compliance with Sharī`ah rules and 
principles. 
 
The IFSB expounded further that in their effort to 
create value for their shareholders, IBs should pay 
attention to the interest of other stakeholders beyond 
their shareholders. The IBs owe a fiduciary duty to 
their PSIAHs which could be parallel to their duties to 
their shareholders.  
 Reference [28] opined that the unique nature of 
Islamic finance and the desire to be competitive while 
still preserving Sharia principles creates a unique 
corporate governance challenges for Islamic Financial 
Institutions. 
Reference [30] in its briefing on corporate 
governance observed that the treatment of PSIAHs by 
Islamic banks raises lots of concern considering the 
position held by PSIAHs between depositors and 
shareholders, and that this intermediate position give 
rise to a number of governance issues for the IBs. For 
example, the bank may decide to postpone the 
distribution of profit in any particular year in order to 
be able to maintain distribution in another period when 
the assets of the PSIAHs does not perform as expected.  
Based on mudarabah contract that underlies the 
operations of PSIAs, IBs place PSIAHs’ funds in 
investment pools, and profit (if any) is distributed 
between the bank and the PSIAHs based on pre-agreed 
ratio, while loss (if incurred) is borne entirely by the 
PSIAHs (except in cases of proven negligence) [31]. 
This imply that it is the PSIAHs and not the 
shareholders of the banks that bear the risk of the 
investment pool. The asymmetry between the extent of 
PSIAHs’ participation in bearing investment risks and 
of their ability to influence the operations of the IBs 
also raises another fundamental corporate governance 
issue [21]. Also, IBs’ practice of commingling of 
shareholders’ funds with that of PSIAHs into 
investment pools raises the possibility of conflict of 
interest and in differential treatment of the participants 
of the pools with the shareholders’ funds getting 
preferential treatment in terms of investment in 
profitable ventures over other participants.  
The practice of using Profit Equalization 
Reserve (PER) and Investment Risk Reserve (IRR) as 
smoothing mechanisms also raise some governance 
issues in the management of PSIAs because it is the 
IBs that have the sole discretion of determining the 
basis of computing and the actual amount appropriated 
into the two reserves without any input from the 
PSIAHs [19]. The use of PER and IRR to smoothen 
PSIAHs’ returns create a transparency issue because 
returns on the underlying investments typically appear 
more stable than they actually are, which makes it 
difficult for the PSIAHs to monitor the true 
performance of their funds [32]. Another implication 
in the use of PER and IRR in income smoothening by 
IBs is that it leads to lack of transparency and would 
distort competition among IBs, because PSIAHs may 
not see the need to withdraw their funds from the banks 
due to poor performance below prevailing market rates 
as long as they receive returns (smoothened) that is 
commensurate with the going market rate [5].  
The above governance challenges in the 
management of PSIAs by IBs calls for the 
establishment of good governance guidelines that 
would ensure the protection of the interest of PSIAHs 
in Islamic banks. 
 
 
V.  ISLAMIC BANKING IN NIGERIA 
 
The amendment of the banking law in Nigeria, that is 
the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 
(BOFIA) in 1991 encouraged the introduction of Non-
Interest (Islamic) banks. Section 66 of the BOFIA 
recognises “profit and loss sharing bank” as a bank 
which transacts investment or commercial banking 
business and maintains profit and loss sharing 
accounts [33]. In 1992 Habib Nigeria Bank as it was 
then known obtained a license to operate a non-
interest1 (Islamic) banking window but only 
commenced operation in 1999. However, the 
operations of the window was short lived, because the 
parent bank-Habib Bank transformed into Bank PHB 
after a merger with Platinum Bank in 2005 and was 
subsequently liquidated in 2011 [34]. In 2011, the 
CBN issued the guidelines for the regulation and 
supervision of non-interest (Islamic) financial 
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institutions [35]. In the same year (2011), the CBN 
licensed Jaiz bank Plc as a full-fledged non-interest 
(Islamic) bank and Stanbic IBTC bank as a window 
(though it closed down the window in 2018). 
Currently, there are two full-fledged non-interest 
(Islamic) banks, two windows of conventional banks 
and three full-fledged non-interest (Islamic) 
microfinance banks operating in Nigeria [36].  
As at December 31, 2019, the total asset23 of the 
Islamic banking subsector in Nigeria was 
N251,059,996,739.43 (approximately USD 
662,427,432) up from N159,046,481,000.55 
(approximately USD 419,647,707)  in the 
corresponding period in 2018, while the total deposit 
of the subsector in the same period was 
N147,592,880,956.43 up from N107,346,430,000.01 
in the corresponding period in 2018 of which 
N68,641,314,851.43 as at December 31, 2019 and 
N44,311,372,000.00 at December 31, 2018 
representing 46% and 41% of the total deposits in 2019 
and 2018 respectively were equity of PSIAHs of the 
four Islamic banks in Nigeria2 This shows the 
significance of PSIAs as a key source of funding for 
Islamic banks in Nigeria that require putting in place 
appropriate policies to protect their interest. 
 
VI. EFFORTS AT PROTECTING THE 
INTEREST OF PSIAHs BY THE 
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA 
 
As recommended by [29], that the supervisory 
authorities should play a role in protecting the interests 
of PSIAHs  with regard to their rights, the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has issued a number of 
guidelines aimed at protecting the interest of PSIAHs 
in Nigeria in order to minimise the numerous 
governance issues associated with the management of 
PSIAHs funds by Islamic banks in Nigeria as 
highlighted in the preceding section. Below were the 
guidelines put in place by the CBN towards protecting 
the rights of PSIAHs in Nigeria: 
 
 
1. Guidelines for the Regulation and 
Supervision of Institutions Offering Non-
Interest Financial Services in Nigeria 
 
To ensure adequate regulation and supervision of non-
interest (Islamic) banks in Nigeria, the CBN issued the 
Guidelines for the Regulation and Supervision of Non-
Interest Financial Institutions in Nigeria [35] in 2011. 
The guidelines require IBs operating in Nigeria to 
make adequate and relevant disclosures to PSIAHs 
about the nature of the contract underlying PSIAs and 
the fact that they are to bear any investment risk as well 
the basis for computing the amounts to be appropriated 
                                                     
 
1 Islamic Banks in Nigeria are referred to as Non-Interest Banks (NIBs) or Non-
Interest Financial Institutions (NIFIs) because BOFIA prohibits banks from using 
any religious affiliation as part of their names 
to the PER and IRR. Disclosure of adequate 
information to PSIAHs would minimise the issue of 
information asymmetry that has been identified by [5] 
as a serious governance issue in the management of 
PSIAHs funds by IBs. 
 
2.  Guidelines on the Management of 
Investment Account Holders for Non-Interest 
Financial Institutions in Nigeria 
 
In 2019, the CBN issued the guidelines on the 
Management of Investment Account Holders for Non-
Interest Financial Institutions in Nigeria [31]. The 
guidelines requires Non-Interest Financial Institutions 
(NIFIs) to put in place the following provisions among 
others to protect the interest of PSIAHs of IBs in 
Nigeria: 
 
i. Adequate framework that would ensure 
prudent management of assets funded by 
PSIAHs’ deposits and ensure that they 
discharge their fiduciary responsibilities 
in managing the PSIAHs' accounts;  
ii. Sound risk management framework that 
would adequately identify, measure, 
monitor and control all the risks faced by 
the assets funded by the PSIAHs’ funds;  
iii. Sound investment policies and strategies 
that ensure PSIAHs’ funds are invested 
in the right class of assets, which takes 
into cognizance their risk appetite; 
iv. A well-defined framework for the 
creation of investment pool as well as the 
distribution of profits and loss (if any) 
among participants in the pool and the 
allocation of expenses to the various 
contributors to the investment pool; 
v. Sound corporate governance framework 
that would ensure adequate protection of 
the rights of PSIAHs, and emphasize the 
fiduciary responsibility of the NIFI in 
managing the PSIAs; and 
vi. Establishment of a governance 
committee as a board committee, which 
shall, among other things, ensure 
adequate protection of the rights of the 
PSIAHs. 
 
The provisions of the guidelines as enumerated above 
that requires NIFIs to put in place framework that 
would ensure that PSIAHs’ funds are invested in the 
right class of assets, which takes into cognizance their 
risk appetite is line with the recommendations of  [7] 
and  [29] who described PSIAHs as having low risk 
appetite when compared to shareholders and as such 
would prefer low but stable return than volatile returns. 
2 The information is obtained from the financial statement published at Jaiz bank 
Plc’s website at jaizbankplc.com and from returns submitted by the other three 
Islamic banks at the CBN EFass platform. The figure was at December 31, 2019 




3. Guidance Notes on Disclosure Requirements 
to Promote Transparency & Market 
Discipline for Non-Interest Financial 
Institutions in Nigeria 
 
The CBN had in 2019 adopted three IFSB standards  
including [37]  Standard on market discipline and had 
thus issued guidance note on disclosure requirements 
to promote transparency & market discipline for NIFIs 
in Nigeria [38]. The guidelines aimed at assisting the 
NIFIs towards implementing the IFSB 4 standard. The 
guidance note sets out the disclosure requirements 
with respect to procedure, frequency, and content of 
information to be disclosed by NIFIs to among others 
protect the interest of PSIAHs of IBs in Nigeria: 
 
i. Disclosure of the types of risks facing 
both restricted and unrestricted PSIAHs 
based on the bank’s investment policies; 
ii. Disclosure of the treatment of assets 
financed by both restricted and 
unrestructured PSIAs in the calculation 
of Risk Weighted Asset (RWA) for 
capital adequacy purposes.  
iii. Disclosure of the general investment 
objectives and policies that are offered to 
both restricted and unrestricted PSIAHs 
based on the general business strategy 
and risk-sharing policies of the NIFI 
iv. Disclosure that PSIAHs funds are 
invested and managed in accordance 
with Shari`ah requirements 
v. Method for calculation and distribution 
of profits and the basis for charging of 
expenses to PSIAHs 
vi. Rules governing the transfer of funds to 
or from PER and IRR and the actual 
amounts transferred to or from the two 
reserves 
Disclosure of information to PSIAHs in in line with 
recommendation of [8] who opined that it is important 
to disclose sufficient information to PSIAHs as this 
would assist them to determine whether or not they 
leave their funds invested with the bank 
 
4. Guidelines on the Practice of Smoothing the 
Profit Payout to Investment Account Holders 
for Non-Interest Financial Institutions in 
Nigeria 
 
In order to regulate and standardize income smoothing 
practices by NIFIs in Nigeria, the CBN issued the 
guidelines on the practice of smoothing the profit 
payout to investment account holders for non-interest 
financial institutions in Nigeria [39]. The guidelines 
specified the techniques of income smoothing 
                                                     
3
 Shariah Supervisory Boards of Islamic banks are called Advisory Committee of 
Experts (ACE) in Nigeria 
permitted for NIFIs in Nigeria and required that 
whatever technique is to be used by a NIFI must be 
approved by its Advisory Committee of Experts 
(ACE)3 and Board of Directors (BOD). 
The guidelines equally require NIFIs to 
ensure that the PSIAHs are fully aware of and 
agreeable to the terms and conditions stipulated under 
the PSIA contract which shall include profit sharing 
ratio and basis of profit distribution and allocation.  
The NIFIs were equally required to clearly 
state in the investment contract any smoothing 
practices that they employ and if they expect the 
PSIAHs to forgo their rights to any portion of income 
to be appropriated for building up reserves such as 
PER and IRR. Specifically, the guidelines allow four 
smoothen techniques and requires the NIFIs to fulfil 
certain requirements with respect to each of the 
techniques as follows: 
 
i.  Use of Profit Equalization Reserve 
(PER) 
 The internal policy of using PER as 
a smoothing technique shall be 
subject to approval of the bank’s 
ACE and the BOD. The actual 
transfers to and from the PER shall 
be subject to ACE and executive 
management committee’s approval 
 The consent of the PSIAHs shall be 
obtained who shall agree to give up 
any portion of the reserve as hibah 
(gift) on the basis of Mubara’at 
when the Mudarabah contract 
terminates. 
 The condition that triggers a transfer 
to PER shall be determined by the 
executive management and 
approved by the BOD. 
 The maximum amount of transfer to 
PER at any point shall be set by the 
BOD and endorsed by the ACE, 
subject to CBN approval 
 The balance in PER shall be utilized 
within a maximum period to be set 
by the BOD and endorsed by the 
ACE after which it shall be 
transferred back to income for 
distribution to existing PSIAHs and 
the shareholders. 
 The PSIAHs’ portion of PER shall 
be added to their equity in the 
liability side of the balance sheet 
while that of the Mudarib (the bank) 
shall be reported under 
shareholders’ funds 
 
ii. Forgoing Part or All of the Mudarib’s 
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Share of Profit 
    A NIFI (as a mudarib, that is fund 
manager) may forgo or give up part or the  
entire Mudarib’s share of profit earned on 
PSIAHs’ funds, but shall not unilaterally 
increase its profit-sharing ratio without 
obtaining the consent of the PSIAHs. 
   The decision to reduce the profit share for  
  Mudarib shall be subject to the consent of    
  the BOD. 
iii. Transfers from Shareholders’ Current or 
Retained Profit 
 
 A NIFI may after obtaining its BOD’s approval 
and shareholders’ consent at annual general 
meeting make transfer from current or Retained 
Profit/General Reserve for distribution to PSIAHs 
on the basis of Hibah (gift).  
 The actual amount to be transferred from current 
profit and/or retained profit/general reserve for 
distribution to PSIAHs at any time shall be subject 
to the decision of executive management 
committee and the approval of the CBN. 
 Both practices of foregoing part or Mudarib's 
entire share of profits, and transfer from 
shareholders' amount of retained profits, shall 
only occur at the point of profit realisation and 
distribution, but not a condition precedent to the 
Mudarabah agreement. 
 
iv. Use of Investment Risk Reserve (IRR) 
 
 The internal policy of using IRR as a 
smoothing technique shall be subject to the 
approval of the bank’s ACE and BOD. The 
consent of PSIAHs to give up any right they 
have to the reserve when the Mudarabah 
contract terminates shall also be obtained. 
 The maximum amount of transfer to IRR at 
any point shall be determined by the BOD 
and endorsed by the ACE subject to CBN 
approval. 
 The balance in the IRR shall be utilized 
within a maximum period to be determined 
by the bank’s BODs after which it shall be 
transferred back to income for distribution to 
PSIAHs. 
 
Fulfilling the above requirements contained in the 
guidelines towards the management of PSIAHs by 
Islamic banks in Nigeria is expected to improve the 
transparency in the management of PSIAHs’ funds by 
NIFIs in Nigeria and could minimise the myriad of 
corporate governance issues identified by [8], [32] and 





There is dearth of literature on deposit mobilisation 
practices by Islamic banks, most of the intellectual 
work in Islamic finance were geared towards 
developing Shari’ah-compliant alternative financing 
products with little attention paid to deposit 
mobilization by Islamic banks. The current contributes 
to the literature on corporate governance associated 
with PSIAHs who are very important source of 
funding for IBs globally. It highlights the numerous 
governance issues associated with the management of  
PSIAs by IBs globally and shares a number of policies 
and guidelines issued by the CBN towards protecting 
the interest of PSIAHs. It is expected that the 
experience of the CBN would assist regulatory and 
supervisory authorities (RSAs) in other jurisdictions to 
implement same policies in order to protect the interest 
of PSIAHs whom have been described as quasi-equity 
holders but without representation on the board of the 
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